JONES v. UNITED STATES: TAX TREATMENT OF
GIFTS OF STOCK IN A LIQUIDATING CORPORATION
In Jones v. United States,' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that a taxpayer's donation of shares of corporate stock to a
charity, after the shareholders adopted a plan of complete liquidation, but before any liquidation dividends were paid, constituted an anticipatory assignment of income in light of the
"realities and substance" of the situation. Therefore, the liquidation proceeds on the gift stock were to be taxed as income to the
3
donor. 2 In so holding, the court reversed its previous position
and adopted an approach taken by the Second and Eighth
4
Circuits.
This Comment will examine the general doctrine and previous case law in this area, and will evaluate the impact of Jones. It
will conclude that Jones' endorsement of the "realities and substance" test set out by the Second and Eighth Circuits was an
unfortunate step, and will propose that future courts adopt instead a per se rule that a gift of corporate stock after a shareholders' vote to liquidate will always result in taxation of the liquidation proceeds to the donor. Such a rule would be consistent
with the national income tax policy, and would not, despite its
mechanical operation, cause arbitrary results.
I.

BACKGROUND

The set of income taxation principles grouped under the
general label, "assignment of income doctrine," is not a concrete
body of law lending itself to clear, capsule treatment. 5 For pres531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976).
Unlike most dividends, a dividend distributed in conncection with a complete
corporate liquidation is treated as capital gain to the shareholder, even though the
dividend includes previously undistributed profits. See I.R.C. § 331(a)(1). If the stockholder transfers the stock to a charity before liquidation, he may be able to deduct the
entire value of the stock without being required to pay any capital gains tax. See I.R.C.
§ 170. If the court holds the transfer to be an anticipatory assignment of income, the
transferor must pay the tax on the capital gains income. If, however, the transfer is
characterized as a bona fide transfer of a capital asset, the transferor pays no capital
gains tax. See Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
3
Jacobs v. United States, 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968), aff'g mem. 280 F. Supp. 437
(S.D. Ohio 1966).
'See Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972); Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
5 For an excellent general discussion of the doctrine, see Lyon & Eustice, Assignment
2

of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigatedby the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1962).
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ent purposes, however, it will suffice to note that the courts,
since the landmark cases of several decades ago, 6 have held that
certain attempts to shift one's tax burden to a taxpayer in a lower
bracket (or, as in Jones, to a tax-exempt party) by giving the
donee the right to receive future income will not succeed. To
defeat such tax-lowering results, the courts simply tax the donor
on the realized income, even though he may have surrendered
all control over the income before it was realized.
The Jones situation, however, is not so simple. Complicating
matters is the possibility that, despite the shareholders' vote to
liquidate, liquidation will not go through to completion. So, the
taxpayer, by assigning the right to receive the liquidating dividends, is not assigning an existing right to receive future income; rather, he is assigning only the potential right to receive
future income. 7
Before proceeding to a discussion of the implications of this
complicating factor and an analysis of its import in the Jones
situation, it will be useful to examine the few precedents involving assignments of stock after liquidation votes.
One of the earliest reported cases dealing with the tax consequences of a gift of stock in a liquidating corporation was
Howard Cook. 8 The Tax Court there held the donor taxable on
the liquidation proceeds, stressing that prior to the date of the
gift (1) most of the corporate assets had been sold, and (2) the
shareholders had voted to liquidate completely and dissolve the
corporation by a certain date. 9 The court also emphasized that
the taxpayer intended to make gifts of liquidating dividends
rather than bona fide gifts of stock. The taxpayer, said the court,
"was well aware that the corporate activities had all but ceased
except for the actual distribution in liquidation. He knew that
the only possible benefits his sons could derive from the gifts
6

E.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930);
cases cited in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 5, at 296-300.
To illustrate the significance of the term,"potential," it may be useful to delineate
the boundaries of the assignment of income doctrine. Where there is no doubt that the
assigned right to recieve income will be realized, the income will very likely be taxed to
the donor. See, e.g., Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940) (gift of bond interest
coupons). Where, on the other hand, there is considerable doubt that any income will
be realized, the court may decide not to tax the donor. See, e.g., Paul A. Teschner, 38
T.C. 1003 (1962) (assignment of right to proceeds in event taxpayer won contest). Although the possibility that the liquidation will not be completed is the controversial
factor in the Jones situation, this Comment takes the position that, once the shareholders have voted to liquidate, the donor should be taxed regardless of any uncertainty that the liquidation will be completed. See text accompanying notes 73-75 infra.
8 5 T.C. 908 (1945).
9Id. at 911.
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would be to receive the amounts distributed in liquidation of
those shares. '' "t
Subsequent to Cook, a federal district court held in Apt v.
Birmingham"l that liquidation proceeds paid upon certain gift
stock constituted income to the donee rather than to the donor.
The donor in Apt transferred the stock to his wife only a few
days prior to liquidation, but before the shareholders voted to
liquidate. At the time of the transfer, he (the sole corporate
shareholder) intended to effect the dissolution of the corporation in the immediate future and had already drafted the necessary papers. 12 The court considered these elements insufficient
to constitute a taxable event. 1 3 With regard to circumstances that
would support a finding that the stock donor was taxable on the
liquidation proceeds flowing to the donee, the court said:
It is the contention of the plaintiff [donor] that in a
situation such as is presented in this case there can be
no severance of the gain from the investment until
either the corporation has been formally dissolved or
the first legal step toward corporate dissolution has
been taken. It would seem that a vote to dissolve a corporation constitutes such a legal step as to effect a
severance of the gain from the investment for federal
income tax purposes. It is also possible that in a situation where for all practical purposes corporate stock
had no further purposes to fullfill except to receive the
corporate assets upon dissolution and the actual dissolution was a mere formality, it could be considered that a
severance had
taken place without a formal vote of
4
dissolution.1
In Winton v. Kelm'

5

the taxpayer transferred certain shares

" Id. This is an early example of the unfortunate tendency on the part of some
courts to consider the individual taxpayer's intent in determining the tax consequences
of gifts of stock in liquidating corporations. Later instances of this tendency are discussed at text accompanying notes 50-61 infra.
1189 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
12Id. at 393.

"3"The intent to dissovle a corporation at a future time and the preparation of
papers to carry out that intent . . . would not of itself be such a step as to work a
severance of the gain from the investment and would not constitute a taxable event for
federal income tax purposes." Id.
4
1d. (citation omitted). On the facts of the case the court held that the gift stock
"still had a purpose to serve other than to recieve the corporate assets upon dissolution
since the corporation was to actively carry on its operations to the end of the quarterly
accounting period ...."Id.
11122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 216 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1954).
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of stock to a charitable trust after the corporate directors recommended a liquidation plan, but three days before the
shareholders voted to approve it. The district court held for the
taxpayer on the ground that "[w]hat had been done looking
toward dissolution, such as the action by the Board of Directors
providing for such vote by the shareholders and the solicitation
of consents, was merely preliminary to substantive action and
comparable to preparation of the [dissolution papers] in the Apt
case."' 6 In reaching its holding, the court made it clear that it
regarded shareholder approval of a liquidation plan to constitute
such "substantive action" as would fix tax liability for liquidation
proceeds upon the person holding the stock at the time of the
vote:
[T]he basic factor.. . is whether or not there had been
a severance of the gain in value of the stock prior to the
transfer. If such has occurred it is taxable to the transferor although he thereafter purports to avoid it by
assignment of the stock. If it occurs after the transfer it
is an incident of stock ownership and taxed to the transferee.
No doubt realization occurs upon the completion of
dissolution. Since the substantial element in such dissolution is the stockholders' vote, the formalities following thereafter in order to complete dissolution may be
7
ignored.1
As the transfers in question occurred prior to such vote, the
court held them effective to shift to the donee the tax liability for
the liquidation proceeds.'
Thus, up to this point, there were at least two courts that
had stated that from the time the corporate shareholders
adopted a plan of liquidation, a gift of stock would constitute a
transfer of a right to receive liquidation proceeds rather than an
interest in a viable corporation. 9
In Jacobs v. United States20 the shareholders adopted a plan
of liquidation prior to the taxpayer's gift of shares to a family
16
Id. at 653.
17Id.
18Id.
9 The Apt and Winton courts clearly were of this view. The Cook court, however,
relied partially on the donor's intent, rather than basing_ its holding solely on the

shareholders' adoption of a liquidation plan prior to the gift of stock. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
2o

280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohiol 1966), aff'd. mem., 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968).
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foundation. 2 1 Nevertheless, the district judge, whose opinion was
adopted by the Sixth Circuit, held that the taxpayer had made a
gift of corporate stock rather than an assignment of a right to
liquidation proceeds; the proceeds, therefore, were to be treated
as income to the donee rather than to the donor. The judge
based his conclusion on the finding that "[i]n spite of the arguments concerning the unlikelihood of a repudiation of the dissolution proceedings prior to their finality, the fact remains that
22
such abandonment was entirely possible.
The Jacobs "technically possible abandonment" test 2 3 has
been adopted by two federal district courts in the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits. 2 4 In each case the court held that a donor of
corporate stock was not to be taxed on liquidation proceeds flow21Id. at 438.
22Id. at 439. In distinguishing Jacobs from Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d
506 (6th Cir. 1965), in which the taxpayer made a donation of insurance policies that
had increased in value due to additions of annual interest to the reserves, the court
emphasized that the taxpayer inJacobs did not have an absolute and indefeasible entitlement to the dissolution proceeds. In Friedman, the Sixth Circuit held that the gain
realized upon maturity of the policies was taxable to the donor.
23For a discussion of the Jacobs test and of the taxation of gifts of stock in a liquidating corporation, see 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 309.
24 Simmons v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 947 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Charleston Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.W. Va. 1971). In addition, the Jacobs
decision may have been partially relied upon by one circuit court. In Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), the Fifth Circuit held that taxpayers making
installment sales of stock in a wholly owned corporation to an independent corporate
trustee after shareholder adoption of a liquidation plan were entitled to the benefits of
the installment sales provision of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 453, and were
not to be treated as if they constructively had received the entire sales price dividend in
the year of the sale. In so holding, the court affirmed the decision of the Tax Court,
W.B. Rushing, 52 T.C. 888 (1969), which had relied in part onJacobs.
The Tax Court, noting that the tapayers had transferred all of their corporate
stock to irrevocable trusts for each of their children, stressed that the liquidation would
not have been completed without an "affirmative act" on the part of the trustees in
authorizing the liquidation distributions and that, as the only shareholders, the trusts
could have voted to rescind the resolution of liquidation. Id. at 897.
In affirming the Tax Court decision, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the case did
not involve an attempt by the taxpayers to shift the gain to a second taixable entity in
order to take advantage of the latter's tax bracket; there would be no effect on the
character or total amount of gain eventually realized. As for the trustee, the court
stressed only that he was independent; there was no mention of the need for the
trustee's "affirmative action" to complete the liquidation or of the fact that the trusts
could have singlehandedly voted to rescind the resolution of liquidation.
It thus seems that the Fifth Circuit, in conspicuously ignoring those parts of the
Tax Court's opinion that were derived from the latter court's reliance on the technical
approach of Jacobs, was not relying on Jacobs. Rather, the court considered as distinguishing the fact that a deferral rather than a shifting of gain was involved. Perceiving
the issue to be one of control, the court used its finding that the trustee was independent of taxpayers' control (and the imminent liquidation dividend consequently beyond
their reach) to allow the taxpayers the benefit of reporting their gain on the sale of
stock as the periodic payments were actually received.
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ing to the donee, even though shareholder adoption of a liquidation plan preceded the gift.2 5 This approach, as established in
Jacobs and applied by the district courts, suggests that a transfer
of stock during liquidation proceedings is not an anticipatory
assignment of income if there is a possibility, no matter how
remote, that the plan of liquidation might be abandoned.
The Eighth Circuit, in Hudspeth v. United States,2 6 rejected
the "technically possible abandonment" test of Jacobs, stating that
when shareholders have adopted a plan of liquidation and abandonment of that plan is unlikely, "the realities and substance of
the events must govern our determination, rather than formalities and remote hypothetical possibilities. 127 Following Hudspeth,
the Second Circuit, in Kinsey v. Commissioner,28 adopted the "realities and substance" test, taxing a stock donor on liquidation
proceeds when the gift occurred subsequent to shareholder
29
adoption of a liquidation plan.
Thus, when again presented with the situation it had previously confronted in Jacobs, the Sixth Circuit was faced with the
rejection of its "technically possible abandonment" test by the
only two circuit courts that had dealt with similar situations and
the adoption by both courts of a "realities and substance" test.
25 Simmons v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 947, 951-52 (M.D. Ga. 1972); Charleston
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 530, 532 (S.D.W. Va. 1971).
26 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972), revg 335 F. Supp. 1401 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
27 Id. at 277. In Hudspeth, as in Jacobs, the taxpayer made a gift of stock subsequent
to shareholder approval of a liquidation plan but prior to the first distributions of the
proceeds. The district court, relying in part onJacobs, found the issue to be whether the
taxpayer was "absolutely and indefeasibly entitled in the immediate future to the liquidating distributions on the stock donated by him." Hudspeth v. United States, 335
F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (E.D. Mo. 1971), rev'd 471 F.2d 275 t8th Cir. 1972). The district
court construed Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.465, .470 (1969) to permit rescission of the
liquidation plan prior to filing dissolution plans with the state, and held that the taxpayer was not to be taxed on the gain attributable to the donated shares. 335 F. Supp.
at 1404-05.
The Eighth Circuit reversed on two alternative grounds. First, the court construed
the Missouri statute to make the plan of complete liquidation irreversible upon adoption, so that even under the district court's approach the taxpayer would be taxable.
But the court went on to reject the district court's "technically possible abandonment"
approach in favor of a "realities and substance" approach under which the taxpayer was
also found to be liable for the tax. 471 F.2d at 277.
28 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
29
Id. at 1063. Reviewing the facts in light of the "realities and substance" test, the
court identified three reasons why it was unlikely that the plan of liquidation would be
abandoned: (1) a plan of liquidation under I.R.C. § 337 had been adopted, and that
section requires liquidation within one year of the adoption of the plan in order for the
corporation to avoid a taxable gain on the sale of assets, see note 32 infra; (2) the donee,
although holding a majority of the stock, did not have the requisite two-thirds control
to prevent the liquidation unilaterally; and (3) the donee's policy was to liquidate shares
of stock given to it. The court concluded that the transfer of the stock was an anticipatory assignment of the liquidation proceeds.
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JONES V. UNITED STATES AND THE "REALITIES
AND SUBSTANCE" TEST

The issue in Jones was whether the gift of shares of corporate stock to a charity, after the shareholders had adopted a plan
of complete liquidation, constituted an anticipatory assignment
of income that warranted treating the liquidation proceeds as
income taxable to the donor. Correctly applying the Jacobs
rationale, the district court held for the donor, reasoning that
because the shareholders could have abandoned liquidation proceedings after the gift was made,
the gift should be viewed as a
30
bona fide transfer of stock.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit summarized the rejection of its
Jacobs test by the Hudspeth and Kinsey courts and then stated that
"[u]pon consideration, we are persuaded to adopt the rule expressed by the Second and Eighth Circuits that the 'realities and
substance' of the events and not hypothetical possibilities should
govern our determination whether an anticipatory assignment of
income has occurred. ' 31 Under the "realities and substance" test,
the court found that completion of the liquidation proceedings
was a "practical certainty," as indicated by three circumstances:
(1) the taxpayer expected the liquidation proceedings to be completed, as explicitly demonstrated by a letter to one of the donees
stating that the corporation was being liquidated and that he
would be notified when to present the stock for cash redemption; (2) the liquidation was conducted in accordance with section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which conditions
the nonrecognition of gain on the sale of assets upon liquidation
within one year of the adoption of a liquidation plan;32 and (3)
the shareholders voted overwhelmingly (968,605 to 175) to approve the liquidation plan. On the basis of its findings, the court
held that the taxpayer had anticipatorily assigned liquidation
33
proceeds to the donees.
3

Jones v. United States, Civ. No. 73-220 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 19, 1975), rev'd,
531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976).
31531 F.2d at 1345.
32 I.R.C. § 337(a) provides:
(a) General rule.-If(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after
June 22, 1954, and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of adoption of
such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete
liquidation, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall
be recognized to such corporation from the sale or exchange by it of
property within such 12-month period.
Loss of this exemption would have subjected the corporation to taxation on the gain on
all assets that were sold.
31531 F.2d at 1345.
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The dissent in Jones argued that even under the "realities
and substance" test, Hudspeth and Kinsey were distinguishable
from Jones.3 4 Because the dissent found it "difficult to imagine a
case with facts more favorable to the claim of a taxpayer than the
present one, 3 5 it concluded that the majority in effect had
adopted "a per se rule that a gift of stock of a corporation in the
process of liquidation will always be treated as an anticipatory
36
assignment of income.
Although the dissent did not specify what it meant by the
phrase "in the process of liquidation," an examination of its language suggests that a corporation is "in the process of liquida37
tion" after the shareholders have adopted a plan of liquidation.
In a discussion comparing the facts of Hudspeth, Kinsey andJones,
the Jones dissent in each instance regarded the adoption of the
liquidation plan as no more than a starting point in the liquidation process, viewing subsequent events (the pre-gift distribution
of liquidation proceeds in Kinsey) or extrinsic elements (the retention of corporate control by the donor in Hudspeth) as the critical
38
elements on which a finding of tax liability should be based.
Accordingly, the dissent came to the conclusion that the court
should not adopt a per se rule treating gifts of stock of a corporation "in the process of liquidation" as anticipatory assignments
of income taxable to the donor.3 9
The question, then, is whether the Jones majority did, in
fact, adopt a per se rule that a gift of stock subsequent to
shareholder adoption of a plan of liquidation will always be
treated as an anticipatory assignment of income.
34

1Id. at 1347 (Lively, J., dissenting). The dissent distinguished Hudspeth on the
ground that the taxpayer in that case retained control of the corporation after the gift
of the stock, while in Jones the taxpayer never owned more than 10% of the outstanding stock. The dissent concluded that "[t]he total domination of a closely held corporation by the donor taxpayer who had committed himself to a plan of liquidation presented to the Hudspeth court a case with 'realities and substance' that are not present in
this case." Id.
Kinsey was distinguished on the ground that a major portion of the assets in that
case had been distributed in liquidation prior to the date of the gift, whereas in Jones
there were no distributions until three months after the gifts were made. The dissent
argued that, as a practical matter, the distribution in Kinsey made the decision to liquidate irreversible, because the "donor taxpayer . . . would have suffered adverse tax
consequences if the plan of liquidation had been abandoned because the distribution he
had already received when he made the gifts of stock would be taxed as ordinary income" rather than as capital gain. Id.
35 Id.
36

Id .

" This inference follows from the fact that the only element of the liquidation
process that was working against the taxpayer in Jones was the adopting of a plan to
liquidate.
38 531 F.2d at 1346-47 (Lively, J., dissenting).
39
Id. at 1347.
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It appears that the majority did not adopt such a rule. In
criticizing the outcome of the case, the Jones dissent emphasized
the facts that favored the taxpayer. The dissent especially noted
that the donor in Hudspeth owned a majority of shares in the
corporation both before and after the gift of stock to the donee
and could thus enforce his decision to liquidate, whereas the
donor in Jones retained no such control. And unlike the situation
in Kinsey, where liquidation proceeds were distributed before the
gift of stock, in Jones no such distribution in liquidation occurred
4°
until three months after Mrs. Jones' charitable gift was made.
However, the Jones dissent failed to recognize that the majority's
application of the "realities and substance test" for anticipatory
assignment of income cases considered not only the weight to be
given to the mere adoption of a liquidation plan but also the
conclusiveness of the vote to liquidate and the "pressure" exerted by section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code to complete
within one year the sale of assets and the distribution of pro41
ceeds in order to avoid tax liability on those proceeds.
Contrary to the claim of the dissent, therefore, it is not
difficult to conceive of cases with facts more favorable to the
taxpayer than those in Jones. Where there has been no sale of
corporate assets prior to the date of the gift, for example, there
would be a more realistic chance that the corporation might later
reverse its decision to liquidate, as the pressure to comply with
section 337 to qualify for nonrecognition of gain does not arise
until some assets have been sold. 42 Or the shareholder vote to
liquidate, "overwhelming" in Jones, might be a close one, thus
leaving open the possibility of reversal if a few shareholders were
to change their votes. In both of those hypothetical situations, a
court using the rule of the Jones majority might hold for the
taxpayer notwithstanding the fact that a shareholder liquidation
vote preceded the gift.
40 Id. at 1346-47. The Jones dissent also listed the following facts as favorable to the
taxpayer's claim: (1) the taxpayer had made other gifts of the corporation's stock in
years prior to the liquidation (the inference being that the gifts in dispute did not result
from a "one shot" tax avoidance scheme to take advantage of the liquidation); (2) the
taxpayer testified that she believed that the gifts of stock she made after the adoption
of the liquidation plan were no different for tax purposes than those made before; (3)
the charitable donees were actual stockholders after the gifts were made, receiving
notices of meetings and voting by proxy on issues which arose before the final dissolution of the corporation; and, (4) the gifts did not consist of stock in a closely held
corporation (although the taxpayer's husband was president and the owner of 19% of
the outstanding stock, none of the gift stock had come to the taxpayer from her husband). Id. at 1347.
41 See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
42 See note 32 supra.
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It appears, then, that the Jones court did not adopt a per se
rule to deal with gifts of stock in liquidating corporations. The
question remains, however, whether such a rule should be
adopted. Both precedent and policy considerations suggest that
it should.
III.

THE PROPOSED PER SE RULE

In adopting its "technically possible abandonment" test in
Jacobs v. United States, 43 the Sixth Circuit ignored the earlier deci46
45
sions in Howard Cook, 4 Apt v. Birmingham, and Winton v. Kelm,
all of which stated that shareholder approval of a liquidation
plan was a crucial event in determining to whom liquidation
proceeds of gift stock should be allocated for federal income tax
purposes.4 7 Those cases were not ignored, however, by the
Eighth Circuit in Hudspeth v. United States.4 8 That court concluded:
Thus, Kelm, like Cook and Apt, found the shareholders'
affirmative vote to liquidate the corporation to be the
requisite legal step necessary to effect a "realization" or
severance of the gain from the investment such that a
subsequent transfer of the stock would constitute a
transfer of the liquidation proceeds rather than an interest in a viable corporation.4 9
The Eighth Circuit, however, went on to say in Hudspeth that a
new dimension was added by Rushing v. Commissioner.50 Rushing
dealt with an installment sale of stock in a wholly owned corporation after shareholder adoption of a liquidation plan. 5 1 Finding that in Rushing "the shareholders' vote was not found to be
sufficient to constitute a realization . .. ," the Hudspeth court
interpreted the case as "delineat[ing] an important exception to
43 390 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1968); see text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
44 5 T.C. 908 (1945).
45 89 F. Supp. 361 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
46

122 F. Supp. 649 (D. Minn. 1954).

47See text accompanying notes 8-18 supra.
48 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
49

Id.at 278.
441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971).
51 For a discussion of Rushing, see note 24 supra.
52 471 F.2d at 278. As indicated at note 24 supra, however, the Rushing court did
not reach the issue of anticipatory assignment of income; rather, the Fifth Circuit relied
on the fact that the taxpayer did not assign liquidation proceeds, but merely arranged
through a sale transaction to receive them on a deferral basis. The court held that
assignment of income principles did not apply to such income deferral. 441 F.2d at
597-98.
50
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S.. [Cook, Apt, and Kelm] and bring[ing] out the essential factors
underlying the basis of the difference-'intent' and 'control.' "3
In the situation before it,5 4 the Hudspeth court found that
evidence of the taxpayer's "intent to liquidate" was provided by
the shareholder vote to liquidate and was reinforced by the sale
of corporate assets. The court, however, stated that other "evidence to the contrary could rebut the presumption that the taxpayer was, in fact, liquidating his corporation. '5 The court concluded that "[t]he liquidation had proceeded to such a point
where we may infer that it was patently never taxpayer's intention
that his donees should exercise any ownership in a viable corporation, but merely that they should participate in the proceeds
of the liquidation." 56
With regard to the element of "control," the Hudspeth
court considered whether the donor or the donee had control
of the corporation after the gift of stock. If the donee has received enough shares to exercise control, then he should be
taxed on the liquidation proceeds because he would have been
able to supersede the donor's initial intent by rescinding the
liquidation had he chosen to do so. On the other hand, if the
donor has retained control, so that the donee has not received
the power to vitiate the donor's intent to liquidate, then "the
shareholder's vote remains sufficient to constitute the necessary
severance of gain,"57 and the donor should be taxed.
In adopting the Hudspeth court's "realities and substance"
test, with its emphasis on "intent" and "control," the Second
Circuit in Kinsey5 8 and the Sixth Circuit in Jones also considered
elements other than the mere fact of a shareholder liquidation
vote in deciding whether anticipatory assignments of income had
occurred. The Kinsey court, analyzing the facts under the
"realities and substance" approach, noted that "the completion
of the liquidation was in accord both with ... [the donee's policy
of liquidating any stock given to it] and with the obvious intention of [the donor]." 59 In Jones, the court concluded:

The realities and substance of the events in this case
indicate that the taxpayer expected the liquidation pro5 471 F.2d at 278.
5 See note 27 supra.
55471 F.2d at 279.
56 Id. (emphasis supplied).
57 Id.
"See notes 28 & 29 supra & accompanying text.
-9 477 F.2d at 1063.
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ceedings to be completed. In fact, the taxpayer explained in a letter to . .. [a donee] that the company
was being liquidated and that he would be notified by
a bank officer when to present the stock for cash
redemption.6 °
The Jones court, in making its finding regarding the
taxpayer's expectation of liquidation, seemed concerned not with
the fact that such an intent on the part of the donor would prevent her from voting to reverse the plan to liquidate (she had less
than one-sixth of the stock necessary to effect such a reversal),
but with a theory that considers the donor's intentions with regard to the future of the stock (even if the donor lacks the voting
power to enforce the intention) in deciding whether the donor
should be taxed. On the basis of this approach the court could
conceivably reach different results for two taxpayers who differed only in that one expected liquidation proceedings to be
completed while the other expected them to be terminated. The
possibility of reaching different results on so tenuous and subjective a ground illustrates the weakness of the "realities and substance" test. Thus, the Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones courts have
transformed a simple, effective approach based on the relative
timing of the liquidation vote and the gift of stock into an indeterminate approach based on the elements of "intent' and
",control.",61
Although it might be argued that the "realities and substance" test allows a court to react to the practicalities of a situation rather than mandating a mechanical application of law to
facts, it is difficult to conceive of situations in which that approach would further the policy underlying the federal income
tax laws. As the United States Supreme Court stated in the
landmark case of Helvering v. Horst,62 "[t]he dominant purpose
of the revenue laws is the taxation of income to those who earn
or otherwise create the right to receive it and enjoy the benefit of
60 531 F.2d at 1345 (emphasis supplied).
6'The "realities and substance" test as developed by these three courts was recently

adopted by the Tax Court in Horace E. Allen, 66 T.C. 340 (1976). In taxing the donors
on liquidation proceeds paid to their donees, the court emphasized that the shareholders had not only adopted a plan of liquidation, but had also declared the liquidating dividends. Id. at 347. The court ignored the element of intent and considered the
element of "control" to be only one of many considerations under the realities and
substance test, thereby adding to the indefiniteness of the test. It is unclear how the
court would have approached the case had there been only an adoption of the liquidation plan prior to the gift of stock.
62 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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it when paid. 6 3 Given this maxim of our tax law, the crucial
income taxation consideration when a taxpayer makes a gift of
stock in a liquidating corporation is not what the donor "intends"
to happen with regard to the completion of liquidation, but
whether the liquidating process has advanced to the stage where
the subsequently distributed liquidation proceeds can be said to
have been "earned"6' 4 before the gift was made. As two courts
have stated, these liquidation proceeds are, in effect, "earned" at
the time the shareholders of a corporation vote to liquidate,
since such a vote supplies the "substantial element" in the liquidation process. 6 5 Before that vote, the corporation has not yet
entered into the "process of liquidation"; after it, only formalities
remain in the path of complete liquidation.66
"Intent" is no more relevant when a taxpayer makes a gift of
stock in a liquidating corporation than it is when a taxpayer
makes a gift of interest coupons torn from his bond, 6 7 makes a
donation of soon-to-mature insurance policies,68 or assigns his
right to renewal commissions on certain insurance policies. 69 In
63

Id. at 119. This underlying principle of the federal income tax system is at the
heart of the courts' reluctance to allow assignments of income to succeed as taxlowering devices: "[T]he purpose of the statute to tax the income to him who earns, or
creates and enjoys it [cannot] be escaped by 'anticipatory arrangements however skilfully devised' to prevent the income from vesting even for a second in the donor." Id. at
120 (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)).
64 The word "earned" is used here in a special sense, to describe a concept that is
important for the assignment of income doctrine. For this purpose, income is said to be
"earned" if its realization has become sufficiently proximate in time, or in likelihood,
that the donor of the right to receive it cannot escape taxation. The word is not meant
to imply "earning" in the sense of "earning" wages. See, e.g., Eustice, Contract Rights,
CapitalGain, and Assignment of Income--the Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REv. 1, 44 (1964). ("[A]
hope or expectation that income ultimately might be realized . . . is not a sufficient
.earning' of that income by the assignor to hold him liable for the tax when such right
eventually
materializes in the hands of the transferee.").
65
See Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649, 653 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 216 F.2d
957 (8th Cir. 1954); Apt. v. Birmingham, 89 F. Supp. 361, 393 (N.D. Iowa 1950).
60 Winton v. Kelm, 122 F. Supp. 649, 653 (D. Minn.), appeal dismissed, 216 F.2d 957
(8th Cir. 1954); John B. Kinsey, 58 T.C. 259, 266 (1972), aff'd, Kinsey v. Commissioner,
477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973); cf. Apt. v. Birmingham, 89 F. Supp. 361, 393 (N.D. Iowa
1950) (no formal vote of liquidation needed where stock has no further practical purpose except to receive the corporate assets upon dissolution).
67 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940). In holding the donor taxable on the
interest paid to the donee, the Court emphasized that the person who creates the right
to receive income should be the person taxed on that income. Id. at 119. See text accompanying notes 62-66 supra.
68 Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1965). The court, in holding
the taxpayer taxable on the maturity payments, stated that one vested with the right to
receive income does not escape taxation by assigning away that right. Id. at 508.
69 Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 125 (1940) ("For the reasons stated ... in
the Horst case, we hold that the commissions were taxable as income of the assignor.").
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each of these situations, the courts have held the donor taxable
on the proceeds, not because of his intent, but because he performed the necessary acts (or owned the property while the
necessary acts were performed) to give to the donee the right to
receive the forthcoming income; the donee in each case needed
to do nothing more than collect the money.
One might attack the per se rule on the ground that, as was
held in Jacobs, there is always a "hypothetical possibility" that a
corporation may reverse its decision to liquidate. 7" Even the
Hudspeth, Kinsey, and Jones courts recognized this argument as
one of form over substance,7 1 however, and it ignores the Horst
axiom that the "purpose of the revenue laws is the taxation of
income to those who ... create the right to receive it .... .,2
More forcefully, one might argue that the per se rule is
inferior to the "realities and substance" test when circumstances
indicate a substantial chance that the liquidation will not proceed
to completion. For example, suppose that, in a state where a
simple majority can initiate or terminate the liquidation process,
fifty-one of one hundred shareholders holding an equal number of shares vote to liquidate. If the taxpayer then donates
shares of stock to a charity, it undeniably is possible that the liquidation may never be effected. Regardless of how likely it is
that the process will be reversed, however, the critical question is
whether that likelihood is relevant to determining the tax consequences of the gift. There are several reasons why it is not.
Firstly, for the per se rule to take effect, there must have
been a shareholder vote in favor of liquidation. Therefore, at the
moment that the rule comes into play, it is likely that the liquidation will take place. This situation, therefore, is not like those
cases in which the existence of future income has been held to be
too "contingent" to allow the application of the assignment of
income doctrine.7 3 In the Jones situation, liquidation will always
be an event that is likely, rather than unlikely, to occur. Because
the per se rule is not triggered until a shareholder vote to liquidate has occurred-at which time the momentum is in favor of
liquidation-the corporation is, at least at that time, under the
control of those shareholders who favor liquidation.
Secondly, Professor Eustice has argued that the factor of
contingency of the income
70 See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.

71 See text accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
72See note 63 supra & accompanying text.

73 See, e.g., Paul A. Teschner, 38 T.C. 1003 (1962); note 7 supra.
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is irrelevant in determining the choice of the proper
taxpayer, particularly when one examines the facts in
the landmark assignment of income decisions in Earl
and Eubank. In Earl the taxpayer assigned the right to
compensation from services to be rendered in the future, while in Eubank the taxpayer assigned the right to
future contingent renewal commissions on insurance
policies previously sold by the taxpayer. In neither case
did the court give any weight to the speculative or contingent nature of the income. The element of contingency or uncertainty does bear on the proper time for
reporting the income as a matter of tax accounting, but
such fact should not be allowed to obscure or control
the fundamentally different questions of whom [sic] is
income when
the proper person to pay the tax on 7such
4
it does eventually become reportable.
Although Eustice notes that "most lower courts have considered
75
this fact [the contingency of the income] to be of great weight,
it is theoretically sound to ignore it in the Jones situation. For one
thing, as was stated above, the uncertainty usually will be small in
such a case. More persuasively, what uncertainty there is adds
nothing to the taxpayer's justification for escaping the operation
of the assignment of income doctrine. When he makes the gift,
he knows that the shareholders have voted to liquidate. At that
point it would be difficult for him to argue that his intent was to
make a gift of stock in a viable corporation. If such were his
actual intention, it would not seem too harsh a rule to require
that he make the gift at a time other than when it is evident that,
if no action is taken to prevent it, liquidation will take place.
Once the per se rule becomes established, taxpayers could, with
some certainty, escape a harsh result simply by making gifts of
stock before a shareholder vote to liquidate. The rule would
afford taxpayers clear notice of its operation, thereby increasing
predictability in tax planning.
Finally, when liquidation is, in fact, halted before completion, the donor will not suffer: there will be no liquidation proceeds that can be taxed to him. Of course, a taxpayer, thinking
an ongoing liquidation process would be halted, might make a
gift of stock with the actual intent of giving shares in a viable
corporation. If, much to his surprise, liquidation then went
71 Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain and Assignment of Income--the Ferrer Case, 20
TAx

L. REv. 1, 43 (1964) (footnote omitted).
Id.

75
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through to completion, he would be taxed on the proceeds. The
taxpayer, however, assumed this risk by making the gift after the
"danger point" when the shareholder vote had indicated that the
momentum was in favor of liquidation. The per se rule's advantages of clarity, simplicity, and predictability are too great to be
outweighed by the possibility that such an unlikely fact situation
might arise. The dangers to a prudent taxpayer in such a situation are too slight to warrant the use of the less predictable
"realities and substance" approach, at least as that test has been
applied by the courts to date.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit's decision in Jones v. United States7 6 correctly rejected that circuit's "technically possible abandonment"
test as the means for choosing the taxable person in the case of a
gift of stock in a liquidating corporation. However, the court
should not have adopted the "realities and substance" test of the
Second 7 7 and Eighth7 8 Circuits. A better test for selecting the
taxable person in such a situation is a per se rule that taxes the
proceeds of shares of stock in a liquidating corporation to any
donor making a gift of such shares after a shareholder vote to
liquidate. Such a rule, in addition to being consistent with the
federal income tax policy, has the virtues of predictability and
fairness to taxpayers.
531 F.2d 1343 (6th Cir. 1976).
Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir. 1973).
71 Hudspeth v. United States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972).
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